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In different types of political transition several measures are necessary to be taken in 
order to achieve an efficient transitional period. Actors of the conflict, former victims and 
perpetrators should be reconciled with each other so that further conflicts do not occur. 
Criminal accountability of those persons who bear the greatest responsibility for human rights 
abuses committed during the conflict period is inevitable, as well as the drawing of an overall 
picture of past events and the official acknowledgement of sufferings of the victims. Beyond 
these measures reparation needs to be provided to victims and usually fundamental changes in 
institutional structure need to be put in place as well, in order to ensure that viable changes, 
peace and security are installed in the affected society. 
Numerous authors and human rights advocates argue that the accomplishment of 
criminal trials is not only an option but also a moral and legal obligation of the state and 
(where its support is necessary) of the international community in order to avoid the impunity 
of persons committing serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law.1 It is their 
duty according to the general and fundamental concepts of justice however, this approach 
simply does not work when the political circumstances do not make it possible for them to 
accomplish this obligation. These are situations where e.g. the internal criminal justice system 
has been broken down by the conflict or where the functioning of international criminal 
judicial bodies can be only rather symbolic as they are not able to run all the trials that should 
be processed in cases of thousands of perpetrators. In such cases criminal accountability does 
not gratify the interests of the affected society, which may be bound rather to prompt 
reintegration of former perpetrators into their local communities to the creation of a reliable 
picture of past events and a common experience of reconciliation. 
In most of the recent post-conflictive situations criminal courts in themselves have not 
been sufficient to constitute justice in a general sense. The above mentioned objectives can be 
better served by an alternative form of transitional justice that can be realized through the 
establishment of truth commissions. In order to make a long-term consolidation achievable, in 
most cases there is an urgent need for both institutions. The present study is dedicated to the 
issue of how the relationship between truth commissions and criminal courts has been 
regulated in different post-conflictive societies of the last decades.  
Following the introduction of the institution of truth and reconciliation commission in 
the South African example, specific situations will be discussed to indicate potential 
weaknesses of the regulation of the relationship between the two institutions of transitional 
justice. 
In the case of Rwanda there was a unique attempt to modify a traditional conciliatory 
system in order to enable it to proceed in criminal matters. The institutional basis of the plan 
was the gacaca system which originally served the aim of reestablishment of the integrity of 
the local community in cases of marital, heritage or property disputes. With the modification 
these meetings were authorized to accomplish also a criminal judicial function. However, the 
broad involvement of non-professionals led to a controversial system violating basic fair trial 
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requirements. Furthermore, the irregular system of gacaca courts, as a category somewhere 
between criminal judicial bodies and truth and reconciliation commissions, seems not to meet 
the initial expectations regarding a fast decrease in the number of detainees sitting in the 
overcrowded prisons. 
In the case of Sierra Leone a special issue appeared with the parallel functioning of the 
truth commission and the Special Court. The personal jurisdiction of the two institutions was 
determined in a properly separated way, and the reconciliation process provided an optimal 
solution for the reintegration of thousands of child soldiers. However, the lack of proper 
regulation restricted their efficiency to a large extent. One of its consequences was the low 
number of ex-combatants who appeared before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
Closer cooperation was established between the East Timorese Commission for 
Reception, Truth and Reconciliation and the Serious Crimes Unit. The Commission became 
an integrated part of the criminal judicial system that strengthened the quasi-judicial character 
of the institution. The greatest problem in this case was not a legal one but an issue of a 
political character. The success of the reconciliation process was undermined by a political 
decision, namely, the establishment of the Commission for Truth and Friendship that ensured 
impunity to perpetrators of the most serious crimes. 
Finally, the last section of the study addresses the unavoidable issue of the relation 
between the International Criminal Court and future truth and reconciliation commissions. 
The dilemma of whether the ICC should hold back in certain situations in favor of a truth 
commission draws the attention to the fact that in some cases the notion of ‘interest of justice’ 
means more than pure criminal justice. The meaning of this notion needs to be determined 
according to the real interests of the people who were personally affected by the atrocities. In 
many countries emerging from an armed conflict or a repressive regime there is an urgent 
need for both retributive and restorative justice, therefore, in numerous cases the parallel 
functioning of criminal courts and truth and reconciliation commissions might be the best 
solution. 
 
 
 
SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION TO THE FUNCTIONING OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS: SOUTH 
AFRICA 
 
 
The functioning of truth commissions can be determined by four characteristics. First, 
they investigate the past; second, they examine not only a singular event but create an overall 
picture about abuses committed in a definite period of time; third, some sort of authority is 
ensured to these truth commissions that makes it possible for them to have greater access to 
information and greater security to undertake sensitive investigations; and finally, their 
functioning is limited to a definite period of time that is closed with the submission of a final 
report on their findings that is usually made public.2 The Latin American commissions were 
the first examples of this institution, although their mandate was determined in a narrower 
way than that of their descendants. Following the functioning of the Bolivian commission 
from 1982 to 1984 – which cannot be called successful as it did not even publish any final 
report – the first truth commission that received broader international attention was the Sábato 
Commission of Argentina that published its findings on atrocities that had occurred between 
1976 and 1983 in a book called Nunca más (Never Again). The next decade brought the birth 
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of two further commissions in the Latin-American region. The National Commission for 
Truth and Reconciliation was established in Chile in 1990, and investigated abuses resulting 
in death or disappearance over the previous seventeen years of the military regime. In the 
following year, 1991, a new phenomenon appeared in the region, namely, the intervention of 
the international community in the establishment of truth commissions. The Commission on 
the Truth for El Salvador was created not by domestic legislative tools but by the United 
Nations and due to neutrality concerns it became a pure international institution without any 
local personnel. The main task of this commission was to investigate past abuses that had 
occurred since 1980.3 The advantage of the determination of a narrower mandate for 
investigation was that the commission has been able to proceed in many more cases than in 
the case of Chile where the Commission investigated 2920 cases.4 On the other hand, it has 
bound all the energy and capacity of the institution and therefore it has not been able to draw 
a reliable overall picture about the past that ought to be a crucial point of reconciliation. 
Compared to the Latin-American commissions, the mandate of the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission was much broader. It had the main task of gathering 
statements of former victims and perpetrators of the atrocities committed during the apartheid 
system, and in addition, it was responsible for deciding about amnesty and preparing 
proposals for necessary measures to be taken in the future in order to achieve long-term 
consolidation.  
At the end of the apartheid system, which was an official policy in South Africa from 
1948 to 1992, the first democratic elections were held in 1994. The African National 
Congress led by Nelson Mandela won the elections with 61 percent of the votes, and 
established the new government. They prepared the draft of the National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act, which was adopted in 1995. 
Control over the enforcement of the Act became the task of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission created by the Act. The Commission had three organizational 
units: the Committee on Amnesty dealt with the amnesty pleas. It granted amnesty if the 
applicant revealed all the relevant facts and circumstances of the crime to which the 
application related and this human rights violation had been associated with a political 
objective.5 This conditional amnesty encouraged former perpetrators to participate in the 
reconciliation process. The second organizational unit, the Committee on Human Rights 
Violations existed as a forum, where the hearings of victims were held, and the Committee on 
Reparation and Rehabilitation dealt with proposals for damages to be paid for the victims. The 
functioning of the three Committees was controlled by 17 Commissioners. Desmond Tutu, the 
highly respected Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town was appointed to the position of the 
President of the Commission. 
Compared to other truth commissions (Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Sierra Leone, East 
Timor, etc.) the South African forum had an outstanding role as it can be called the most 
efficient one. Approximately 38 thousand cases were elaborated, and the testimony of 21 
thousand victims and 7 thousand perpetrators was recorded.6 Use of the testifier’s own 
language was ensured, safe hearings were possible and the hearings became public to a 
properly wide extent. The procedure of fact-finding went on with suitable intensity and 
efficiency compared to the other commissions. 
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There were several relevant factors that played a significant role in the functioning of 
this institution and this statement is applicable to all truth and reconciliation commissions. 
The composition of the commission plays a central role. Effort must be made to let as many 
diverse interest groups as possible participate in its work. On the other hand, this can increase 
the number of personnel, which will increase the expenses as well. 
In territories where local individuals cannot be trusted to gain respect from all sides 
involved in the conflict or would be put in serious personal danger, foreigners must be 
preferred for appointment to the position of commissioner. The obvious disadvantage of this 
step will be that these commissioners probably will not be totally aware of the details and 
background of the specific situation. 
The role of former participants in the conflict must be taken into consideration as well. 
The more former victims are involved into the work of the commission, the more credibly it 
can work in the protection of interest of victims. Moreover, if more former perpetrators, who 
kept their political positions, assume the role of commissioner, the enforcement of specific 
decisions will be more likely.7 
For the suitable efficiency of the Commission’s functioning it is necessary to ensure that 
the hearings lead to the collection of reliable, credible and detailed testimonies. The process 
of hearings is determined by numerous factors. One significant point is how widely public 
hearings occur, as they can serve as immediate education. From this point of view the 
retention of former perpetrators in power creates a fundamental obstacle. The circumstances 
of the hearing are also a determining factor, especially considering the special nature of these 
cases. Irregular procedure if often needed, such as visiting the victims in their own homes. 
The less formal the conversation is, the more possible it is to show empathy for the suffering 
and pain of victims, and in this way to increase the probability of gathering credible 
testimonies. 
It is of outstanding importance to ensure that participants can talk in their own language, 
if necessary with the assistance of translators. Partially, it is a basic condition of revealing the 
facts in an appropriately detailed way. In addition, it can serve as a sign of respect and 
acceptance of the cultural and ethnic identity of the witness. This is especially necessary in a 
territory like South Africa with high ethnic diversity and eleven official languages. The 
conflictive situation also demands that the safety of witnesses be ensured. Appropriate 
testimony can be expected only if the witness does not need to worry about negative 
consequences on his own life or health and that of his family.8 
All of these factors are fundamentally determined by the political situation. The period 
of violence might be finished in different ways. If the change occurred through a unilateral 
military victory, repression enforced by the new governing power will be determining. On the 
other hand, if consolidation was approached by negotiations, further discussions and fact-
finding will more probably appear based on voluntary participation. If the former perpetrators 
keep their political leadership positions to some extent, they might be able to undermine the 
efficiency of the fact-finding work with political pressure. Beyond that, the declaration of 
total amnesty will be much more probable in this case. 
A highly dominant factor concerning the work of a commission is how widely its 
existence and its specific decisions are accepted by political parties, the political and military 
elite and the public. The support of public opinion can be based on ideological considerations. 
In the case of South Africa it could have been ensured by the Ubuntu theology which gives a 
central role to the principle of humanity and the Christian values of mercy and reconciliation, 
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if the still existing conflictive situation had not had destroyed the strength of this ideological 
background. Finally, the proposals of the Commission regarding financial reparations were 
not realized. Nevertheless, the truth-revealing work of the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was accomplished in such a highly successful way that this 
commission still can be considered the most efficient one so far. 
Truth telling is a central element of most traditional African justice systems which have 
the main aim of reintegrating both perpetrators and victims in the society, in their local 
community.9 In this region the restoration of balance in the community is much more 
important than the punishment of the guilty as the traditional unit of the African society is the 
group and not the individual.10 In these cases the main goal of reconciliation can be better 
served by alternative forms of justice which do not concentrate on the faceless state which 
was “attacked” by the violation of law, but rather on individuals and communities who were 
directly affected by the crime. At the same time, these processes focus on the general desire of 
the whole population for peace and stability, “sacrificing” the possible personal interest of the 
victim for the accountability of the perpetrator. At the same time, personal interest cannot be 
underplayed, especially following extreme situations regarding high number of perpetrators 
and victims as occurred after the Rwandan genocide. 
 
 
 
SECTION 2. THE FAILURE TO GRANT CRIMINAL JUDICIAL AUTHORITY TO 
ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONS OF JUSTICE: RWANDA 
 
 
During the Rwandan genocide approximately 800 thousand people lost their lives 
during the spring of 1994. The broad involvement of the population in the killings created a 
situation that required a unique approach of the issue of how to call to account more than 
650,000 perpetrators, as the number was initially estimated. Traditional models of criminal 
justice simply did not fit this situation. The extremely high number of people involved in the 
genocide was only one of the reasons to show that a new solution needed to be found. The 
other side of the problem was that the judicial system (which had not functioned properly 
even before 1994) had broken down and could not be reestablished from one day to the next. 
Most of the court buildings were destroyed or damaged and most of the professional lawyers 
(who had composed a narrow circle even before the genocide) were either dead, had fled the 
country, or were involved in the killings. As a consequence, only five judges and 
approximately fifty practicing lawyers remained in the country and were available for the 
reestablishment of the Rwandan judicial system.11 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established by the United Nations in 
1994, could not be considered as a possible judicial body to solve this problem, especially 
because its mandate was to proceed in cases of high-level perpetrators. In this sense, however, 
it facilitated the “cleansing process” of the political arena, completing 27 cases of leaders and 
organizers of the genocide. It imposed life-imprisonment on, among others, Jean Kambanda, 
the former Prime Minister of the interim government of 1994, Jean de Dieu Kamahunda, the 
former Minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, and Emmanuel Ndindabahizi, 
the former Minister of Finance, and condemned to long-term imprisonment numerous 
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Interahamwe leaders, mayors and préfets who had been the highest-level government officials 
in the administration-units of Prefectures and were most responsible for the massacres in the 
country.12 
Nevertheless, it must be mentioned that the ICTR has not run any trial in cases of RPF13 
leaders who were responsible for serious atrocities, which might raise some doubts regarding 
the impartiality of the Court and therefore may undermine its reputation. Moreover, there are 
still dominant figures whose cases should be proceeded by the Court but who are fugitives 
from justice, such as Félicien Kabuga, who was one of the masterminds of the genocide, 
financed the importation of machetes and other weapons used for the massacres and owned 
the Radio Television Libre Mille Collines.14 As long as these suspects are walking free, it 
cannot be stated that the ICTR has accomplished its mission and it is also not probable that it 
can close its functioning before 2008, as was the original plan. The Rwandan domestic 
judicial system is still not ready to deal with such high-profile cases, and this situation was far 
worse in the years directly following the genocide. However, it was obvious that in the case of 
lower-level perpetrators a solution had to be found inside the boundaries of the state.  
The declaration of any kind of amnesty was not an alternative, as this idea faced radical 
objections from the population. Even the possibility of a South African style reconciliation 
process was strongly opposed by the victims, who demanded the enforcement of full criminal 
accountability. Without this first inevitable step reconciliation would have remained an empty 
word without realization. On the other hand, the enforcement of accountability did not seem 
to be an easy deal, especially as the new government was not open to any kind of external 
support, refusing to accept foreign lawyers, who could have strengthened the domestic 
judicial system.15 
The first attempt at a solution was the involvement of confession as a mitigating factor 
in the regular criminal proceedings. In this way confession could contribute to the reduction 
of the high number of detainees in the overcrowded Rwandan prisons. Nevertheless, there 
were serious concerns about the procedures as they did not guarantee due process. Prisoners 
who confessed their crimes could not be separated from those who did not make the same 
decision, raising further security problems. Moreover, statements given by those who had 
confessed (mostly perpetrators who were already in prisons waiting for their sentence or for 
their trials to be commenced) were not properly analyzed, that would have been necessary for 
truth-telling, as this task was not included in the mandate of the courts.  
 
 
Paragraph 1. The irregular solution of gacaca courts 
 
 
The special situation required an extraordinary solution, and the establishment of an 
alternative system of transitional justice seemed to be unavoidable. Eventually the 
modification of the traditional gacaca system became this alternative solution. The traditional 
process served the aim of settlement of internal disputes of local communities and 
reestablishment of their integrity. These were ad hoc meetings of the inhabitants of a village 
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chaired by the leaders of the community. The main aim of these sessions was the settlement of 
marital, property or heritage disputes and they did not deal with criminal cases or result in 
individual judgments. It rather led to community solutions and many times required only a 
symbolic act of reparation from the perpetrator, such as providing beer to the members of the 
community as a gesture of reconciliation.16 
This system was the basis of the solution that turned into the creation of a decentralized, 
non-reliable and unfair criminal justice system. The first Organic Law no. 40/2000 on the 
establishment of gacaca courts included a plan for an ideal structure for the gacaca system 
which seemed to be utopian under the actual circumstances. According to the original plan 
250,000 individuals would have been employed as lay judges. After the first years it became 
obvious that this strategy could not be followed in reality, therefore the new Organic Law no. 
16/2004 was adopted in order to simplify the system, with a reduction of personnel to 
170,000.17 This new law became the basis for the functioning of the gacaca courts, which 
began operation in 2005. 
There are two main levels in the gacaca system: at the cell level more than 9,000 courts 
were established as pre-trial chambers and at the sector level more than 1,500 “higher level” 
courts deal with more serious cases, while the Sector Courts for Appeal proceed in cases of 
appeal. In the pre-trial process the cell level courts prepare lists of names of those who lived 
in the affected community before the genocide, those who were killed and the people entitled 
to receive compensation and those who can be accused of the involvement in the genocide. 
Indeed, they are supposed to prepare a history of the local community during the genocide.18 
Their other main task is to categorise the crimes and put the accused individuals in the right 
category. This classification system determines which courts have authority to proceed in the 
case of a certain perpetrator. The first category of crimes falls outside the authority of gacaca 
courts. It includes leading, planning or organizing the genocide, killing of more than one 
person, rape, and, following the 2004 Organic Law, torture, degrading treatment of a human 
corpse and the commission of more acts of sexual abuse. Killing of one person belongs to 
category 2, causing physical injury appears in category 3, and crimes committed against 
property count as category 4 crimes. Cases belonging to categories 2 to 4 can be proceeded by 
the gacaca courts, while category 1 perpetrators shall be called to account by regular criminal 
courts.19 
Similarly to criminal proceedings, confession became an important mitigating factor in 
the gacaca proceedings. Those who confessed before their name appeared on the list of the 
accused persons can be sentenced to 1-3 year imprisonment in the case of category 3 crimes, 
and to 7-12 years in the case of category 2 crimes. In case of a confession after accusation, it 
may mean an imprisonment of 3-5 years in category 3 and a sentence of 12-15 years 
imprisonment in category 2, while without confession imprisonment would be 5-7 years and 
25 years or more, respectively. For category 4 crimes, perpetrators may be obliged to pay 
compensation to the family that was affected by their criminal act.20 
 
 
 
Paragraph 2. Consequences of the involvement of too many lay judges in criminal 
justice 
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This system could have met the desire of victims for criminal accountability and at the 
same time contributed to the reduction of number of detainees living in overcrowded prisons 
but reality brought obstacles which had not been expected at the beginning. The first problem 
appeared with the increase of further accused perpetrators identified by their fellows. The 
more former perpetrators confessed in the hope of a restricted sentence, the more new names 
appeared on the list of accused individuals, which resulted in an unexpected increase in the 
number of detainees. If we consider the cell, sector and appeal levels together, between 10 
March 2005 and 14 July 2006 2,365 perpetrators were released, as they were found not guilty 
or were sentenced to a prison sentence less than or equal to the time already spent in 
detention. Meanwhile, 2,579 accused persons were condemned to imprisonment longer than 
the time spent in prison, imprisonment of 25-30 years was imposed on 1,404 perpetrators and 
at the appeal level only 93 sentences were alleviated.21 These statistics show that this 
alternative justice system established with the aim, among others, to reduce the number of 
detainees in overcrowded prisons has not yet met this expectation. 
The results of the trials up to now do not indicate a high efficiency of the process if we 
consider the original plans for the closure of the gacaca process in December 2007. Out of the 
818,564 persons who have been prosecuted for having committed genocide, 741,295 were 
qualified as perpetrators of crimes falling into category 2 and 3 and as such fall under the 
authority of gacaca courts.22 In the 15- month period ending in the summer of 2006, only 
8,836 trials were completed. On the sector level 7,721 trials were completed, i.e. 22 percent of 
the files was forwarded to sector courts. Appeal courts tried 1,115 further perpetrators that 
covered 67 percent of the total number of cases sent to the appeal level.23 These numbers 
indicate that the functioning of sector level courts has not been as fast as was expected, and 
even with radical change, it could not be likely to achieve the original goal of closure of the 
proceedings before gacaca courts till the end of 2007. 
The other problem was that the whole system was built mostly on non-professionals 
without any salary, which opens a door to corruption. In many cases they are personally 
affected by the atrocities. As an extreme example can be mentioned the case of Francois-
Xavier Byuma, a member of the local non-governmental organization, Turengere Abana 
(Rwandan Association for the Protection and Promotion of the Child) who, as a member of 
this organization, investigated the case of a person who was alleged to have raped a 17-year-
old girl. Although the Organic Law no. 10/2007 ordered the dismissal of judges from the 
gacaca courts if they commit any act which is incompatible with the quality of a person of 
integrity, Mr. Byuma was sentenced to 19 years’ imprisonment, which decision was taken by 
the very same person who was the subject of his investigation, but recently works as a gacaca 
judge. 
This extreme example illustrates well the fact that gacaca judges make decisions about 
long-term (and even life) imprisonment in proceedings where fair trial guarantees cannot be 
ensured. Gacaca courts are entitled to issue arrest warrants and subpoenas and to proceed 
with search and seizure, but the accused persons do not possess the right to see their own files 
before their hearings and they are not provided legal representation either. The accused do not 
have the right to silence, since they are obliged to answer all the questions posed by the court. 
Statements given by witnesses are often not reliable, since either the witness had been 
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corrupted or had a personal interest in not telling the truth (as a perpetrator for mitigation, or 
as a victim out of vengeance). At the same time both witnesses and judges are targets of street 
attacks.24 
Beyond mentioning the numerous weak points of the system, it must be admitted that 
gacaca courts ensure a forum for perpetrators, victims and affected members of the 
community to meet and discuss together all the past events, that can become a common 
experience of truth revealing and in this way may facilitate reconciliation and reintegration of 
former perpetrators into their communities.25 Furthermore, its processes require less time than 
regular criminal proceedings and education was not a problem to solve at the establishment of 
the system as it is based on non-professional personnel. On the other hand, many Rwandans 
do not trust these courts and boycotted them with their disappearance or have fled to 
neighboring countries fearing false accusations and unfair trials.26 The question still plays a 
paramount role: how can long-term reconciliation be reached through a vengeful system 
where judges are the victims of the perpetrators?  
 
 
 
SECTION 3. THEORETICAL APPROACH TO THE ISSUE OF REGULATION 
 
 
Paragraph 1. Advantages of criminal jurisdiction related to reconciliation 
 
 
Following the examination of the alternative solutions of transitional justice in South 
Africa and Rwanda, the name of another country appears from the African continent in the 
context of truth and reconciliation commissions. This country is Sierra Leone, in the case of 
which the issue of the relationship between the commission and criminal courts played a 
central role. 
The possible role of accountability in a transitional period depends on the specific 
circumstances characterizing the situation. There are no recipes telling how to “cook” an 
optimal transition and the “the dessert” of reconciliation. However, there are general 
conclusions and assumptions that can be drawn based on past experience. Justice Goldstone 
emphasized five positive contributions of criminal proceedings that can ensure reconciliation: 
individualization of guilt, public and official acknowledgement to the victims, an accurate 
recording of history, efficient deterrence, and finally, revealing the role of state institutions in 
the conflict and human rights violations.27 In case of international criminal tribunals the 
attention of the international community is an additional factor. 
The leaders who were earlier the representatives of a country or community and who 
committed serious human rights violations (ideally) become criminals in a trial. In this way, 
Nuremberg transferred the responsibility for war crimes from the whole group of German 
people to individuals who could really be held responsible for atrocities committed during the 
World War II.28 The same individualizing effect can be achieved on the level of the members 
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of the community by domestic criminal trials. In other words, one cannot suppose anymore 
that the neighbor of someone is also a criminal just because they live next to each other, if the 
justice system does not confirm it. Obviously, the pure advantage of individualization can be 
achieved only if the judicial system works in a proper way, and in a post-conflictive society 
this is far from being evident. 
Concerning the acknowledgment of past abuses it must be emphasized that victims do 
not need only an empty gesture of apology, but an official acknowledgement of all the 
terrifying events that resulted in memories that haunt them from night to night. After the 
publication of the Final Report of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 
President Mandela apologized publicly to victims on behalf of the government.29 This nice 
gesture was not enough for the real solution of problems. Lack of sufficiently broad political 
support for the strict accomplishment of criminal proceedings and reasonable financial 
reparation hindered smooth reconciliation.30 
Criminal accountability of those who were not granted amnesty could be a sufficient 
official acknowledgement of past events. Furthermore, in cases of criminal proceedings the 
broad participation of victims can contribute even more to the healing of their wounds. Past 
international criminal tribunals did not concentrate enough on this issue, but the establishment 
of the International Criminal Court (hereafter: ICC) brought a change of approach also in this 
respect. The Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence ensure the opportunity 
for the victims to participate widely throughout the process. This can be illustrated also by the 
establishment of the Victims and Witnesses Unit. (However, this chance is ensured only to 
those who can be used as witnesses before the Court. It is hard to imagine though that for 
example an average Ugandan farmer would ever travel at his own expense to the Hague in 
order to listen to proceedings that could help him to understand the past. In this regard, the 
positive effect of the ICC processes on reconciliation is limited.)  Those victims who appear 
before the Court benefit from the “recovery” measures, including expertise in post trauma 
rehabilitation and the measures taken for their protection. Moreover, the Trust Fund 
established for the benefit of victims and their families gives a kind of reparative mandate to 
the ICC.31 
Revealing the truth after a change of regime or an armed conflict is a crucial point of the 
transition process. It is true that without a proper knowledge and education of history a 
healthy society is impossible to build, and all the dark spots of the past can undermine the 
future of a society. The words of Justice Goldstone cannot be debated: “public exposure of 
the truth is the only effective way of ensuring that history is recorded more accurately and 
more faithfully than otherwise would have been the case. The Nuremberg Trials have made 
the work of Holocaust deniers far more difficult.”32 Nevertheless, it is not obvious whether 
the immediate revelation of facts would facilitate reconciliation.33 
The issue of contribution of criminal trials to truth-telling about the role of state 
institutions raises a further dilemma. When the role of state institutions is highlighted by a 
domestic court, the immediate question to be posed is who will examine the role of the 
judiciary in past abuses, since without its silence they could not have occurred. This part of 
the truth sometimes demands an independent institution to examine the role of judicial bodies. 
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The investigations of an international criminal tribunal or the ICC prove that the 
international community pays attention to the development of the transitional situation. This 
is especially significant in countries where the judicial system has broken down and there is 
no way to call to account those who bear the greatest responsibility. In this way, the 
proceedings can contribute to the actual negotiations in a highly positive manner. The 
domestic actors of public life who work on the transition to democracy no longer must depend 
only on the poor facilities within the boundaries of their country, and they can have a stronger 
hand even in deciding which parties can sit at the negotiating table.34 Besides, those former 
political or military leaders who would hinder the positive outcome of the negotiation process 
can be “knocked out” both from the course of the transitional discourse and the future 
political arena. According to Jürg Lindenmann, in situations where there is a strong public 
opinion that the international community failed to intervene in order to prevent further abuses 
the involvement of the ICC is particularly important as proof for the fact that the international 
community “cares”.35 I would reverse this statement, saying rather that international criminal 
jurisdiction cannot be a solution for providing assistance as a subsequent excuse for having 
failed to intervene at the right time. 
 
 
 
Paragraph 2. Possible disadvantages caused by criminal justice 
 
 
While there are arguments that criminal courts are the most efficient tool for the 
prevention and abolishment of collective guilt individualizing responsibility, others see 
criminal jurisdiction as vengeful, continuing a cycle of hatred.36 I share the opinion of those 
who state that the deterrent consequence of accountability can by all means be debated on the 
level of political or military leadership. It is far from sure that powerful political forces driven 
by ideological factors would ever be affected by the possibility of future prosecution. 
Furthermore, if perpetrators of grave crimes cannot be arrested, the possible “knock out” 
effect fails, and in this way it can even hinder the negotiation process, making the leaders of 
repressive regimes more reluctant to contribute to political consolidation.37 The same feature 
can be advantageous on the other side of the conflict, as it can encourage resistance forces to 
sit at the negotiation table, such as in the case of Uganda where leaders of the LRA became 
open for negotiation as a result of the proceedings initiated by President Museveni and his 
government at the ICC. (It is another problem that they soon demanded the suspension of the 
proceedings which were referred to from then on as obstacles in the peace process.) Uganda is 
one of the cases showing that recent transitions tend to develop rather through negotiation 
than the military victory of one side to the internal conflict. Accordingly, there is no place for 
“victor’s justice”. In many cases the former military or political forces remain in power, 
which may mean that too much pressure for criminal proceedings can lead to the risk of the 
revival of the conflict. 
Further characteristics and consequences of criminal proceedings can be emphasized in 
relation to the role they really play in reconciliation. The prosecution examines the facts 
relevant to the case and charges, just as the defense tries to extract parts of the truth which are 
useful for arguments. Criminal courts are not in a position to analyze statements of victims in 
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such a high number that would be necessary to draw an overall picture of the past. This leads 
to a partial truth. On the other hand, if trials are carried out in a way to serve as history lessons 
as well, this can easily create show trials, therefore, the main function and aim of trials cannot 
be to reveal the truth on a large scale, but to examine the facts and events limited to the 
specific cases at hand.38 Nevertheless, there are suggestions that in the case of the ICC it could 
be useful for reconciliation if the Office of the Prosecutor – as an international, objective 
examiner of facts – would issue a summary report of its findings following the model of 
independent prosecutors in the United States who submit such conclusive reports after the 
closure of their work.39 
Considering the situation of the whole society even the justice that trials ensure serves 
only in part the common interests of local people. Focusing on the desire of victims for 
accountability, trials do not affect the community of the perpetrator in a positive manner. As a 
result, reconciliation in the community of the victim is facilitated but not that in the 
community of the perpetrator.  
The other face of individualization is that trials usually create an “us-versus-them” 
dynamic. A view may emerge that those criminals who sit before the court are guilty for all 
the terrifying events, although it is clear that politicians, for instance, could not have been put 
in the relevant decision-making positions without the contribution of average citizens. In 
South Africa, for example, the appointment of high-level representatives of the apartheid 
system, such as Magnus Malan (former minister of defense) or Eugene de Kock (former head 
of the secret assassination unit) would not have been possible without the votes of middle 
class suburban housewives and white businessmen in favor of the National Party.40 
Considering the South African example, one must face another possibility that can 
occur and that can hinder the process of reconciliation: namely, the negative outcome of these 
high-profile proceedings. Magnus Malan and his 19 co-accused fellows were acquitted, 
although their activity to establish hit squads in order to kill political opponents was proven. 
In 2002, a number of other acquittals occurred in cases of politically motivated crimes. 
Wouter Basson, the head of the apartheid’s chemical and biological weapons program, was 
acquitted by the Pretoria High Court on all charges of murdering anti-apartheid activists, 
although there were 150 witness statements as evidence against him.41 In the same year 
President Mbeki granted pardons to a number of other persons who were sitting in prison for 
politically motivated crimes.42 The official position is that these trials were based purely on 
their merits, but it is probable that political reasons were behind these unreasonable acquittals 
and pardons. According to this view, the main aim was to facilitate the governance of the 
country by putting an end to trials related to apartheid, and that it was not anymore about 
giving up justice for a more noble aim of transition to democracy, but about making it easier 
to manage the affairs of the state. At the time of change of regime in 1994 and 1995, civil 
society, which had originally opposed the idea of any kind of amnesty, could accept the 
conditional amnesty in order to achieve a higher aim of smooth transition, but in 2002 there 
were no morally acceptable reasons for granting a de facto general amnesty. The common 
opinion of the population is well mirrored by the reaction of a non-governmental 
organization, Jubilee South Africa, about the Malan case: “the trial revealed only that 
apartheid’s powerful military and secret service bosses still have much to hide and still have 
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the means to obstruct the wheels of justice.”43 Whatever the real reasons are, these doubts 
prove the great significance of fair trials in the process of reconciliation. 
Meanwhile, if we consider the issue of “lower level” perpetrators, we have to face the 
reality that in some post-conflictive situations there is no possibility of accomplishing 
criminal trials in all the relevant cases. The best example might be Rwanda, where around 
650,000 Hutus were involved in the genocide who ought to have been called to account by a 
non-existing domestic criminal judicial system, not to mention the fact that most of these 
people were not only perpetrators but also victims used as tools of a well-organized system of 
genocide. As it was mentioned earlier, in the course of the conflict the country was destroyed, 
there were no working institutions to enforce law. Many court buildings were wrecked, the 
few qualified legal professionals were either killed, participated in the genocide or fled the 
country.44 In such situations an alternative form of justice has to be found in order to avoid a 
long-term catastrophe. In these cases strictly insisting on the legal obligation of criminal 
justice can result in further decline of the affected country and in order to avoid such decline, 
alternative forms of justice are turned to. 
 
 
 
SECTION 4. PARALLEL FUNCTIONING OF THE TRUTH COMMISSION AND THE SPECIAL 
COURT: SIERRA LEONE 
 
 
A major argument against truth commissions is that their functioning is incompatible 
with the notion of justice as their process rejects prosecution and therefore can be seen as a 
threat to the interest of justice. It is also true that not to call to account former perpetrators 
would undermine the newly born democracy. A blanket amnesty should be refused under any 
circumstances, which is already a generally accepted view of the international community. 
Accordingly, reconciliation processes cannot be used with the aim of disguising a general 
amnesty, as was the idea of Mario Enriquez, former minister of defense of Guatemala: “We 
are fully in support of a truth commission. Just like in Chile: truth, but no trials.”45 Impunity 
would undermine also the realization of the aims of reconciliation as it could encourage the 
victims to take revenge and the perpetrators to go on with violent acts. Nevertheless, there are 
alternative solutions available beside trials which do not allow the denial of past events, but 
help the society to rather pay attention to the future than to the past. 
It is very important to see that truth commissions are not second alternatives to criminal 
courts, but a better kind of institution to address reconciliation. These two forms of justice 
have different aims and different tools for achieving them, and in this way, they can work 
simultaneously as well, supporting each other’s function. Truth and reconciliation 
commissions can play a significant educational role in the field of human rights, but a change 
of views of the abusive leadership is not likely to be produced by them. This is one of the 
reasons why parallel functioning of the two institutions might be the best solution for 
handling a post-conflictive situation. 
At this point we cannot mention too many practical examples for this solution, as there 
have been only a few places where proceedings before the truth commission were connected 
to criminal trials, such as in Bolivia and Argentina, where criminal trials could be commenced 
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as a result of truth commission investigations.46 Special alternatives can also be considered, 
such as the example of Ethiopia where no truth commission was expected to accomplish 
investigations that eventually could have been used by the criminal courts, but rather the 
Special Prosecutor’s Office was entrusted to publish a truth-commission-like report about the 
abuses committed during the Mengistu regime. However, finally the SPO dropped the plan of 
publishing the report as it decided to concentrate only on prosecutions.47 According to the 
“casting” in Sierra Leone, the Special Court deals with the perpetrators who were responsible 
for the most serious crimes committed during the armed conflict and the cases of lower level 
perpetrators fell under the authority of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
 
 
 
Paragraph 1. Establishment of the two institutions 
 
 
During the eleven years of Sierra Leone’s civil war both the government and peace-
keeping forces and members of the rebel armed groups became responsible for the most 
serious international crimes. The long list of abuses committed against the civilian population 
included willful killing (many times with an extreme brutality such as by burning), mutilation, 
recruitment of children and sexual abuses. In this case, crimes committed against civilians did 
not appear as a collateral damage but as a method of warfare. 
At the end of the hostilities the  significant question was raised how to call to account 
the persons responsible for the most serious crimes of an international character, and how to 
ensure appropriate and efficient procedure in their cases since the UN did not recognize the 
general amnesty declared by the legislation of Sierra Leone related to international crimes. 
The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court was excluded as it applies only to crimes 
committed after July 1, 2002 when the Rome Statute entered into force. A special solution 
was necessary, which was later declared in the agreement between the UN and the 
government of Sierra Leone on January 16, 2002. The objective was to establish a Special 
Court. The UN Assistance Mission for Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was given the task of 
ensuring the safety of the functioning and of the personnel of the court located in Freetown, 
the capital of the country, and the government was obliged to co-operate with the judicial 
body and support it in all parts of the procedures, such as in the identification or location, 
arrest and detainment of perpetrators, their transfer and the disclosure of necessary documents 
to the Court.48 
As opposed to the creation of the already existing ad hoc tribunals of an international 
character (ICTY, ICTR), this judicial body was established with a mixed character, including 
national and international elements. The reason for this kind of establishment was the will of 
the government to preserve a possibility to influence the functioning of the Court. Meanwhile, 
the establishment of a new and expensive international tribunal would not have been 
supported by the international community. The obvious disadvantage was that since it was not 
established by the power of the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII, it was not 
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empowered to issue binding orders to states and therefore the will of states to co-operate 
played a more significant role.49  
Beyond the appointment of Court officials, the Court’s international character is 
manifested in the fact that the functioning of the ICTY and ICTR was a sample to follow, 
especially in terms of the creation of the rules of procedure.50 Although the Security Council 
had asked the Secretary-General to consider the possibility of the Court sharing the judges of 
the Appeals Chamber with the two already existing ad hoc tribunals, the proposal was 
rejected.51 Notwithstanding, decisions of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY and ICTR 
became influential on the jurisdiction of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court.52 
The Statute of the Special Court ensured priority to the Court against the national 
criminal judicial bodies. Accordingly, the Court may issue an order at any time during the 
proceedings requiring the domestic criminal courts to give a certain case into its authority.53 
Its relation to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was more debatable. 
Already the drafters of the Lomé Agreement were inspired by the high number of lower 
level perpetrators to mention the necessity of the establishment of a truth commission. In 
1999 the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson offered her help to 
President Kabba for the establishment of the Commission. The President accepted the offer, 
which was followed by the two week visit of two officers from the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) with the aim of analyzing the local situation and 
suggesting alternatives for the support of the Office. Finally, the government drafted a bill 
according to the suggestions of the Office, which became the basis for the act of February 22, 
2000 on the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.54 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established as a national institution by 
internal legislation but it had a strong international character. The Selection Coordinator for 
the appointment of the commissioners was the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-
General in Sierra Leone. The Chair of the Commission55 was appointed by the President of 
Sierra Leone, the Methodist bishop Joseph Humper, and the retired justice of the High Court 
of Sierra Leone, Laura Marcus-Jones became Deputy Chair, according to the recommendation 
of the Selection Coordinator and Mary Robinson. They also had a dominant role in the 
appointment of the further five members of the Commission. In addition to them the Selection 
Panel, composed of dominant institutions of Sierra Leone56, was working on the initial and 
further appointments.57 
The project of the establishment of the Commission was a program of the OHCHR and 
its main financial sources were also ensured by international actors. As a result, some doubts 
arose as to the independence of the institution, as a significant part of the 4 million USD 
support (earlier planned for 10 million USD) arrived from the UN, the United States, the 
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United Kingdom, the European Union, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. The government of 
Sierra Leone could provide only 100,000 USD for this aim.58 
At the beginning of the functioning of the Commission numerous non-governmental 
organizations were extremely enthusiastic and promised their support for the future. This 
enthusiasm diminished with the decrease of financial support and at the end, the International 
Center for Transitional Justice remained almost the only one giving real support through 
technical means and expertise. The other organizations failed to provide the promised 
assistance.  
 
 
 
Paragraph 2. Differences regarding personal jurisdiction 
 
 
Regarding the relation between the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission it is worth beginning with the examination of their personal scope of authority 
that illustrates well the difference between the mandates of the two institutions. Following the 
closure of the debates on the personal jurisdiction of the Court, the draft suggested by the 
1315 Security Council Resolution59 was included in the Statute, being preferred to the opinion 
of the UN Secretary-General. According to this provision:  
“The Special Court shall [...] have the power to prosecute persons who bear the 
greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra 
Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, including 
those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and 
implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.”60 
The objection of the Secretary-General affected the second part of the provision which 
emphasizes the role of leaders and their responsibility, arguing that the Security Council 
influenced the Prosecutor of the Court. He stated that this paragraph of the Statute would 
restrict the authority of the Court to crimes committed by political and military leaders.61 
Despite his objection, the personal jurisdiction was finally restricted to these persons. 
In the case of peacekeepers, the authorities of the sending state were given exclusive 
jurisdiction.62 This issue did not become a subject of debate. A much bigger dilemma was 
how to call to account juvenile and child perpetrators. One side of the problem was that the 
number of child soldiers was extremely high.63 On the other hand, their case was different 
than that of adults as they were manipulated and forced to commit crimes in most of the cases. 
Accordingly, the Special Court has no jurisdiction over any person who was under the age of 
15 years at the time of the commission of the crime.64 
Special rules apply for perpetrators between the ages of 15 and 18 years at the relevant 
date. In their cases the Court has the power to prosecute, but has to take into account the main 
aim of their reintegration into their communities. In their cases special measures can be 
ordered by the Court, such as community service orders, counseling, correctional, educational 
and vocational training programs or approved schools.65 These provisions indicate a useful 
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contribution of the Court to reconciliation. Moreover, the Statute recommends the 
reconciliation mechanism in cases where it seems to be more appropriate to address the case 
of the affected juvenile offender.66  
These provisions were also inevitable because the system of juvenile justice does not 
work sufficiently well in Sierra Leone. The age limit for criminal responsibility in Sierra 
Leone is 10 years under domestic law, which is too low by international standards. The 
Children and Young Persons Act of Sierra Leone does not prohibit the imposition of life 
imprisonment on a juvenile, and the domestic courts often use this punishment for young 
offenders. The other weak point of the system is that persons between the ages of 14 and 17 
years can be sent to adult prisons. Detained juveniles who are awaiting trial are not always 
tried as quickly as they should be. Because of this delay, they must spend much more time 
detained than would be legally acceptable. The magistrates working at juvenile courts do not 
receive special training on children’s rights and issues of juvenile justice. Beyond this lack of 
special knowledge that would be required to ensure fair trial guarantees, in most cases 
juveniles are not represented in court and do not receive legal advice when they are arrested 
and during their detention in police cells.67 
It is obvious that the functioning of authorities for juvenile justice seriously violates the 
international standards included in the Convention of the Rights of Child and the UN 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice. The latter document 
includes general and also more specific rules, and in both categories there are norms violated 
by the justice system in Sierra Leone. According to the “Beijing Rules” young people 
“require particular care and assistance with regard to physical, mental and social 
development”. In order to reach this aim, professional training and refresher courses shall be 
ensured for all the personnel dealing with juvenile cases.68 The Beijing Rules encourage states 
to avoid criminal proceeding and prefer alternative solutions if possible.69 The Commentary 
of this article emphasizes that in many cases non-intervention is the best solution, and 
recommend redirection of young offenders to community support services instead of a 
criminal process in order to avoid the negative effects of such proceedings (for instance the 
stigma of conviction and sentence).  
In these cases the truth and reconciliation process can be an optimal solution, which can 
be a forum for former child-soldiers to clarify before their community what crimes they 
committed and why they committed them, so that they can get a chance to return to society. 
This was obvious to the drafters of the Act on the establishment of the Commission therefore, 
the relevant provision of the document declared that the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission during its functioning must give special attention to the experiences of children 
within the armed conflict.70 During its work, which was closed in 2004, the Commission 
fulfilled this obligation: one of its key themes was the issue of children affected by war. It 
followed the Recommendations made by the expert group meeting in June 2001,71 and treated 
child perpetrators primarily as victims and gave special attention to girls and gender-based 
violence. In the case of children it preferred the confidentiality of hearings and ensured the 
assistance of psychosocial workers and the presence of parents. Its personnel also counted 
with experts on issues affecting children. The proceedings included traditional ceremonies 
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acting as a symbolic gesture that the child is accepted back into the community. For example, 
in Northern Sierra Leone inhabitants of the affected village washed the soles of children and 
then their mothers drank the water used for it.72 At the end of its functioning the Commission 
published a child version of its Final Report as well, that had been written with the assistance 
of children in order to facilitate a better understanding of the Report.73 
Beyond child perpetrators, the narrow scope of personal jurisdiction of the Special 
Court logically resulted in the fact that the investigations of the Commission covered a much 
broader spectrum of cases and affected persons. The same statement is valid related to internal 
judicial bodies, as beside individuals the fact-finding activity of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission affected different social groups, political and economic actors (for instance those 
with interests in the diamond business) and foreign actors as well. This broad determination 
of personal jurisdiction was essential for the Commission to be able to draw an overall picture 
of past abuses. 
 
 
 
Paragraph 3. Lack of proper regulation of cooperation 
 
 
A further important question appeared with the simultaneous functioning of the two 
institutions, namely, how to regulate their relation. In this respect, the example of Sierra 
Leone cannot be avoided. The OHCHR organized a workshop with the support of the 
UNAMSIL in order to discuss the possible rules applicable to the relation of the two 
institutions. There were two dominant views: supporters of the one stated that criminal 
proceedings would affect consolidation in a negative way, so a strong truth commission 
should be established that would be independent of the Special Court. According to the other 
view, a reconciliation process with the declaration of amnesty would not be consistent with 
the obligation of the state to call to account the perpetrators. Therefore, the Commission 
should play only a subsidiary role beside the Court and it must support the functioning of the 
judicial body by unconditional information-sharing. These debates were closed without any 
specific result, but it was decided that draft guidelines applicable to the relation of the Court 
and the Commission needed to be determined. Later on, the OHCHR and the UN Office for 
Legal Affairs organized a meeting of experts where the following general principles were 
adopted: the aims of the functioning of the two institutions are different and both aims shall 
be achieved in order to establish long-term consolidation, so complementarity is needed; 
accordingly, the priority of the Special Court against domestic courts does not exist related to 
the Commission; and the cooperation shall be grounded by an agreement including detailed 
regulation of their relation.74  
A stronger connection of the two institutions could not have been possible due to 
several reasons. For instance, the Court would not have been able to use the statements given 
to the Commission as evidence, since the proper degree of reliability could not have been 
guaranteed during the proceedings before the Commission. In the meantime, an automatic 
information-sharing system would have deterred former perpetrators from participating in the 
reconciliation process. Parallel functioning on the basis of complementarity, more intensive 
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cooperation related to witness-protection, conditional information-sharing and common action 
in order to raise public awareness would have increased the efficiency of both institutions. 
Unfortunately the agreement proposed by the expert meeting was never adopted and the 
principle of complementarity was not enforced in practice. Although the Act on the 
establishment of the Commission declared its total independence and pursuant to the relevant 
provisions the priority of the Court applies only to national judicial bodies, despite the 
theoretical independence of the two institutions different views seemed to be born among the 
walls of the Court and those of the Commission. Predictably, the Court argued for its own 
priority in certain practical situations and the Commission declared its opinion on the 
necessity of independent simultaneous functioning. According to the arguments of the 
Department of Justice of Sierra Leone,75 legal grounds for the priority of the Special Court 
could be found in the agreement concluded by the United Nations and the government of 
Sierra Leone, which says that the government shall support the functioning of the Court in the 
identification of affected persons, information-sharing, arrest and in any other field where it is 
needed.76 At the same time it cannot be forgotten that the Commission was not an organ of the 
government, so this obligation did not apply to it. Beyond the international treaty mentioned 
earlier, the 2002 Special Court Agreement (Ratification) Act referred to the obligation of all 
actors of the country to cooperate. Accordingly, all individuals or legal entities and any other 
institutions established according to the law of Sierra Leone shall comply with the orders 
adopted by the Special Court.77 
The Court followed its view on priority in practice, as was obvious in the case of 
request that arrived from the Commission in which it asked the Court to give out accused 
persons detained by it in order to involve them in a hearing. Among others, this affected Sam 
Hinga Norman, who was a deputy minister of defense and the chief of the Civil Defense 
Forces and was still a member of the government in 2003, when he was arrested in his own 
office. Many saw him as a national hero leading fights against the Revolutionary United 
Front, forgetting all the atrocities committed by the CDF, such as forced cannibalism. Earlier, 
in February 2003 he participated in the opening ceremony of the Commission where he even 
made a promise to meet a commissioner later in order to make an interview. In the summer of 
the same year, the legal representative of Norman refused the interview when the Commission 
requested it officially. After the Commission had closed the functional period of hearings, 
Norman changed his mind and stated that because of the prolongation of the Court 
proceedings he expected judgment from the people of Sierra Leone, and therefore he would 
have liked to participate in a public hearing. This change in Norman’s behavior was obviously 
aimed at the manipulation of the criminal proceedings by the pressure of public opinion. 
Therefore, the question came again into focus: may the Commission hear defendants of the 
Special Court before the closure of their proceedings? 
The draft of a guideline prepared by the Registrar of the Court would have empowered 
the judicial body to decide on this question. It would have entitled the judges to decide 
whether the Commission hearing could occur and what questions could be posed at the 
hearing. Moreover, the interview would have been supervised by a lawyer from the Court 
who could have interrupted or even suspended the hearing. Due to the strong negative 
reaction of the Commission the draft was modified so that the application for a hearing could 
be rejected only by the presiding judge of the Court if he thought that it would not serve the 
interest of justice. The Commission was far from satisfied with the second version, either. At 
the same time it submitted an application to the Court relating to a hearing of Norman. The 
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application was rejected by Justice Thompson with the argument that the application 
mentioned Norman as a central figure of the conflict, which statement could be understood as 
a kind of pre-judgment, violating the principle of the presumption of innocence. This was 
interesting because a part of the indictment including similar sentences had been earlier 
confirmed by the Court. The real aim and reason was to hinder the possible influence on the 
adjudication of the Court which was emphasized by Justice Robertson in his decision about 
the appeal as well. He emphasized that a public hearing may seem to be a trial which could 
create expectations in the public regarding a future judgment of the Court.78 
The view of priority defended by the measures taken by the Court can be rebutted by a 
teleological interpretation. Considering the main aim of the establishment of the Court it is 
clear that the main intent was to strengthen the entire system of transitional justice, and not to 
undermine the functioning of one of its main institutions such as the Commission. This is 
mirrored by Security Council Resolution 1315 on the establishment of the Court, which 
declares that the aim of its functioning shall be to strengthen a reliable and credible justice 
system, to call to account persons responsible for the most serious crimes in a proper way and 
to facilitate reconciliation.79 Accordingly, a cooperative relation should have been built 
between the Court and the Commission in order to serve together the common aim of national 
unity and consolidation. This approach appeared in the statement of Joseph Humper, the 
President of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, in which he said that both institutions 
were “going to the promised land, but by different roads.”80 
Beyond the debates referred to, the fact, that the two institutions were working 
separately, led to the duplication of work and the waste of time and financial resources. As a 
result of having failed to inform the population in a proper way, very often even local people 
were not aware of the functioning of the two institutions. This can be well-illustrated by a 
small story about a citizen who asked a taxi driver in Freetown to take him to the Special 
Court who was finally driven to the building of the Commission.81 
 
 
 
Paragraph 4. Rules adopted related to information-sharing without practical 
enforcement 
 
 
One of the most significant questions related to the possible cooperation was the 
regulation of information-sharing and at the end this remained the only field in which the 
debates could be settled. The affected non-governmental organizations suggested different 
solutions. The International Center for Transitional Justice held that certain conditions should 
be determined regarding information-sharing; Amnesty International preferred free 
information flow.82 Finally, the government gave a narrow discretionary power to the Court to 
ask information from the Commission. In this case three conditions needed to be fulfilled: the 
information requested had to be specific, essential to a fair determination of the innocence of 
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the accused, and could not reasonably be obtained from any other source.83 The problem was 
that it was not clarified who was entitled to determine whether these conditions were met. 
This regulation followed the so-called “conditional information sharing model”, but 
according to the reports of a local non-governmental organization, PRIDE, the lack of specific 
determination of conditions caused in practice the free exchange of information, mainly in the 
direction of the Special Court.84 This was a significant obstacle to the participation of ex-
combatants in the reconciliation process. Many of them were afraid that statements given to 
the Commission would be used against them, or that after these statements they would be 
summoned by the Special Court as a witness in the proceedings of their commanders, upon 
whom they were still dependent. 
This view was not supported by the statements of Prosecutor David Crane who said at 
the beginning of the functioning of the Court that he did not intend to use any materials 
deriving from the Commission and he wanted to rely only on information obtained by the 
Court.85 At the same time, obviously due to the nature of the functioning of the Commission, 
some information could be obtained by the Court as a result of public hearings. It was also 
vital to handle the information on a confidential basis in cases where the personal safety of the 
affected person depended on that, especially because it was the only tool in the hand of the 
Commission for witness protection. Article 7 (3) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Act entitled every person to give a statement on a confidential basis, and gave no one the right 
to oblige the Commission to give out the information included in these statements.86 
Accordingly, the Commission did not give out any such information after the closure of its 
work and publication of its Final Report, and despite the debates on this issue, it insisted on 
this opinion and suggested also in the Report that these statements must continue to be 
protected.87 
Regarding the same issue, the procedural rules applicable to the Special Court refer to 
confidentiality within the context of the relation between the legal representative and his 
client.88 Furthermore, Article 17 (4) g) of the Statute declares the right of the defendant that 
he cannot be obliged to confess to being guilty.89 The rules applicable to the ad hoc tribunals 
(ICTY, ICTR) to be followed by the Special Court broaden the scope of this right and apply it 
to witnesses as well. According to the (minority) opinion of William Schabas these rules 
should also be applied to the witnesses appearing before the Commission on the basis of the 
logic of the system.90 This argument can be debated, as a statement given at the Commission 
cannot result in automatic criminal procedures. At the same time, considering the possible 
practical consequence that the statement may be obtained by the Court, this opinion may be 
reasonable. It raises a further question as to whether there is any deterrent against the 
appearance of ex-combatants before the Commission deriving from this uncertainty. 
This was a paramount issue, since the participation of ex-combatants was of outstanding 
importance. It was essential in order to reintegrate the more than 50,000 people having taken 
part in the hostilities into their former communities.91 On the other hand, how could the 
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victims be reconciled with perpetrators who were not present at the proceedings? Without 
reconciliation and reintegration one alternative remained for ex-combatants: the way back in 
war. It cannot be forgotten that ex-combatants had vital information about the details and 
nature of the conflict, and this information was fundamentally necessary for creating a clear 
and whole picture of past events. 
While local organizations felt that ex-combatants were deterred from appearing before 
the Commission because they were not sure of the separate functioning of the two institutions, 
there are experts who do not think that this was a significant problem. They believed that this 
issue was determined by emotional reactions rather than by rules on amnesty or information-
sharing, because very soon it became clear for combatants that the Special Court was hunting 
“big fish”, and that foot-soldiers did not fall under its authority.92 
Nevertheless it can be stated without a doubt that in general greater public awareness 
facilitates the increase of the number of participants in the reconciliation process, since former 
perpetrators and victims are fully aware of the consequences of their statements given to the 
Commission. 
 
 
 
SECTION 5. TRUTH COMMISSION AS AN INTEGRATED PART OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM: EAST TIMOR 
 
 
As is illustrated by the cases elaborated above, the first truth commissions were non-
judicial bodies. This situation changed with the establishment of the South African 
commission which was empowered to decide about individual amnesty pleas. This tendency 
was continued by the commission of East Timor. Moreover, this commission became an 
integrated part of the criminal justice system. 
 
The territory of the country was invaded by Indonesian troops in 1976 after a two year-
long civil war that lead to the end of the Portuguese administration. After 23 years of 
Indonesian occupation (which was never recognized by the international community) the 
United Nations intervened in the situation establishing the UN Mission in East Timor 
(UNAMET) in 1999. In a referendum on August 30 the same year 78.5 percent of the 
appearing citizens (98 percent of the eligible voters appeared) declared their will to refuse any 
proposals for autonomy and to gain independence. At the same time it was obvious that 
Indonesia would not give freedom at such a low price. Irregular armed groups were organized 
by some generals of the Indonesian army composed of supporters of the integration in order to 
prevent losing the colony. The targets of their attacks were those who supported 
independence. During a period of several weeks more than 1,500 people were killed, 
approximately 500,000 civilians were chased out of their homes and 250,000 were deported to 
West Timor, while 73 percent of the houses and buildings were destroyed. Finally, violent 
acts by East Timorese and the pressure of the UN compelled the Indonesian armed forces to 
leave the territory, and on September 28, 1999 an agreement was concluded between 
Portugal, Indonesia and the UN giving the authority of administration to the United Nations. 
In October the UN Security Council established the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) by Resolution 1272 (1999). The mission was 
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comprised of three main components: governance and public administration; humanitarian 
assistance and emergency rehabilitation; and a military component. 
As part of the development project of the justice system, the Office of the General 
Prosecutor, the Service of Legal Representation, three district courts, an Appeal Court and 
several prisons in the capital of Dili were established in the year 2000. Two international 
experts and the expert delegation of the International Development Law Institute arrived in 
Dili in order to give some expert support in the training of judges. A part of this process was 
the establishment of those judicial panels that received exclusive jurisdiction regarding the 
most serious crimes93, namely, the Special Panels for Serious Crimes that comprised the 
Serious Crimes Unit in the Dili District Court.94 
 
 
 
Paragraph 1. The establishment and functioning of the Commission for Reception, 
Truth and Reconciliation 
 
 
Alongside the need for proper repression of serious crimes the necessity for revealing of 
truth about past events and solving problems raised by the high number of lower level 
perpetrators through an alternative justice system grew more and more urgent. A solution was 
given by the 2001/10 UNTAET Resolution establishing the Commission for Reception, Truth 
and Reconciliation (CAVR - the Portuguese acronym) in April 2002. The Commission had a 
mandate for two years that was prolonged with six more months. Its main functions became 
(i) to investigate the nature and causes of human rights abuses committed between 1974 and 
1999; (ii) to serve the interest of victims and promote reconciliation; (iii) to support the 
perpetrators in returning to their communities; (iv) to write reports on its findings and to make 
recommendations for future measures that should be taken for the above aims, and (v) to refer 
the cases of the most serious crimes to the Office of the General Prosecutor (OGP). The 
Resolution empowered the Commission to adopt its own rules of procedure and to establish 
its organs if necessary for the fulfillment of its functions.95 
In order to carry out its investigations the CAVR had the authority to convene hearings, 
to issue subpoenas, to request information from relevant authorities or individuals in East 
Timor, to be present at exhumations relevant to Commission inquiries, and to request an 
Investigating Judge of the District Court to issue a search warrant to enable police authorities 
to search premises considered as containing evidence relevant to a Commission inquiry. 
Where the CAVR was convinced that it would be in the interests of justice, or there was a 
likelihood that harm would ensue to any person as a result of the proceedings being open, it 
could order that such proceedings be held behind closed doors.96 
During its work the Commission heard more than 1400 cases. For the initiation of 
proceedings the perpetrator had to submit an application that included a detailed description 
of the relevant events and acts, an acknowledgement of the commission of crimes, an 
explanation of the connection between those acts and the conflict and the identification of the 
addressed local community. 
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The hearing ensured the possibility for the perpetrators, victims and the affected 
members of the community to express their views about the negotiated events. The process 
was closed with the issuance of a Community Reconciliation Agreement that included the 
description of the revealed facts, the acknowledgement of the commission of crimes and the 
service that the perpetrator had to provide for the community.97 This Agreement ensured 
criminal and civil legal impunity to the relevant individual concerning the act mentioned in 
the Agreement, but any failure of the fulfillment of the obligations imposed by the Agreement 
was qualified as a criminal act.98 The courts enjoyed only a limited authority to control this 
decision-making process. They could examine whether the sanction imposed by the 
Commission – these included community service, reparation, public apology or another act of 
contrition99 – exceeded what was reasonably proportionate to the acts disclosed, and whether 
the act was a violation of human rights principles.100 In the majority of cases former 
perpetrators were required to make an apology to the community rather than to carry out any 
specific act of community service or to provide compensation to the victim.101 
 
 
 
Paragraph 2. Factors encouraging perpetrators to participate and information-
sharing 
 
 
Strong motivation for former perpetrators to participate in the reconciliation processes 
plays an outstanding role in the long-term reestablishment of the integrity of local 
communities. One of the reasons for this is that without broad participation the reconciliation 
process cannot be completed. Just to mention one example, an East Timorese suspect 
appeared before the Commission in order to clean his name before the community, to prove 
that he was only an eye-witness to murders. He identified the two actual perpetrators, but 
those two persons did not return to East Timor, and accordingly did not appear before the 
CAVR. As a result, although the affected person was reaccepted into his community, the 
widows of the victims never talked to him as they still suspected him of the commission of 
the murder.102 The same effect occurs with those members of the community who do not 
participate in the hearings and then question the credibility of the process. 
Accordingly, great emphasis should be put on promoting all those circumstances that 
might encourage the affected individuals to appear before the commission, and also on 
reducing those factors that might discourage them. In the case of East Timor the commission 
was entitled to accept information on a confidential basis, but it could not guarantee anything 
in regard to a possible criminal investigation. Even this information had to be disclosed to the 
Office of the General Prosecutor if requested. In such cases it becomes more likely that the 
proper functioning of the truth commission cannot be realized because of the witnesses’ fear 
of prosecution. The other side of the coin is that protection or privilege over information 
given to the commission might protect perpetrators who should be brought to trial. This may 
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limit the information available to the prosecution and the defence, and might result in 
impunity.103 
This latter argument was the basis of the regulation on the right of the OGP to request 
information from the Commission.104 Generally speaking, a relatively good relationship was 
developed between the SCU and the CAVR in terms of cooperation. 
Regarding the question of which institution had authority over a specific case, the SCU 
had a stronger position. A copy of all statements received by the Statements Committee of the 
Commission had to be transmitted to the OGP, which had to decide within fourteen days 
whether it intended to exercise its exclusive authority over serious crimes. The Commission 
could proceed only if the OGP refrained from exercising its special power. Nevertheless, if a 
hearing at the Commission revealed credible evidence about the commission of a serious 
crime, it had to refer the evidence to the OGP, which could then initiate an investigation.105 
According to the initial regulation the Commission was not entitled to proceed in cases 
of serious crimes “under any circumstances”, but the practical problem of the broad 
involvement of the population in the hostilities made it impossible to draw such a sharp line. 
Therefore, this wording was amended to “in principle” by the UNTAET Directive on Serious 
Crimes No. 2002/9. This ensured a broader scope for the Prosecutor to decide not to 
investigate, even over matters that could technically constitute serious crimes.106 
Considering this issue another question can be raised: how can the notion of serious 
crimes be determined? In the East Timorese case this notion included genocide, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, murder, sexual offences and torture. However, the type of crime was 
not the only relevant factor determining whether the Commission had authority over a certain 
case. According to the UNTAET Regulation on the establishment of the Commission, the 
question of whether it could proceed had to be determined by the following relevant factors: 
(i) the nature of the crime, (ii) the total number of acts committed by the affected person, (iii) 
whether he or she organized, planned, or ordered the crime or was following the order of 
someone else, and (iv) whether a serious criminal offence had been committed, in which case 
the SCU had exclusive authority.107 This determination had common points with the 
qualification of cases before gacaca courts in Rwanda regarding the leadership-factor, but 
here a more sophisticated regulation was given. On the other hand it did not include the age 
factor, although greater emphasis should have been put on this issue because of the children 
who were usually forced or compelled to join the armed groups. 
 
 
 
Paragraph 3. Big fish swim away 
 
 
Lack of efficiency of transitional justice institutions was reflected not only in the fact 
that the number of lower level perpetrators who participated in the CAVR hearings was not 
satisfactory. This lack was also demonstrated regarding those individuals who had held 
leading positions during the conflict. „Small fish” seemed to be affected at a much higher rate 
than their „big” fellows. In order to avoid accountability the majority of the former leaders of 
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militias did not return from West Timor. Revealing of the circumstances and the 
accountability of perpetrators were not sufficient, which resulted in great dissatisfaction 
among the people of East Timor. In order to achieve these aims the efficient cooperation of 
the CAVR, the SCU and the government would have been necessary. 
Moreover, it became a legal reality that despite the desire of people for accountability, 
there is no chance for the accomplishment of criminal proceedings in these high-profile cases. 
This is undermined by a political agreement based on the ever more intensive dialogue 
between the Indonesian and East Timorese governments. In the framework of this more 
peaceful relationship, Xanana Gusmao, President of East Timor, and Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, President of Indonesia concluded an agreement establishing the Commission of 
Truth and Friendship on March 9, 2005. 
The actual aim of this commission is to prevent prosecution in cases of high ranking 
military officers who are responsible for the commission of crimes against humanity before or 
during 1999. The Agreement hindered all judicial investigations into crimes committed during 
the Indonesian occupation.108 The fundamental necessity mentioned earlier, that the 
continuation of suspended investigations is essential for real reconciliation, was not taken into 
consideration by those who prepared the draft Agreement. The decision-making political 
leaders did not disguise the actual goal of this regulation either. The Prime Minister of East 
Timor, Mari Alkatiri, declared himself that the main aim of the establishment of the 
Commission was not to provide justice.109 However, the problem is that the criminal 
accountability of the affected perpetrators responsible for the most serious crimes is 
unavoidable for long-term reconciliation. 
 
 
 
SECTION 6. RELATIONS WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
 
Chasing „big fish” will always be a paramount – and at the same time, a delicate – issue 
in post-conflictive societies and in this regard the International Criminal Court will play a 
central role in the international scene. This new institution of international criminal justice 
cannot be ignored in the examination of the relationship between truth commissions and 
criminal courts. 
 
In the preparatory discussions at the Rome Conference there were proposals for a 
possible provision on truth commissions related to Article 17110, but in the end no explicit 
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provision on amnesties or truth commissions was included in the text of the Rome Statute, 
leaving in this way a broad scope for the Court to decide about this question on a case-by-case 
basis.111 The question of whether domestic criminal courts are functioning properly way so 
that it can be the basis of inadmissibility might raise several dilemmas, but in the case of a 
truth commission process going on in the affected country this issue may be even more 
challenging and a decision in favour of truth commissions would demand a very flexible 
interpretation of the Statute. Article 17 (a) and (b) require an investigation but they do not 
order that it must be a criminal one. Accordingly, the Prosecutor might find that conditional 
amnesty with a truth process satisfies the requirements of an investigation and decide that the 
case is inadmissible.112 Nevertheless, the Pre-Trial Chamber has the right to review such a 
decision and send a request to the Prosecutor to reconsider the decision. 
It must also be mentioned that this provision has to be interpreted in a narrow way since 
it was drafted in a negative manner. The exceptions to the principle of admissibility are 
regulated as a first step, and as a second step certain exceptions are determined even for these 
exceptional cases. It is obvious that as far as a truth commission is concerned, the main rule 
would be admissibility, and the fulfilment of the conditions for inadmissibility would create 
an exception.113 
The conditions for inadmissibility are determined in a strict sense. Under Article 17 
paragraph 1(b) a case has to be investigated by the affected State and it is also required that 
the State has to decide not to prosecute, but not with the aim of supporting impunity, since the 
decision cannot result from the unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute. 
With a flexible approach an alternative forum of justice, which has the power to send the case 
to criminal courts after the completion of its procedure might be accepted as a proper way to 
fulfil the conditions provided by Article 17, provided that these proceedings guarantee the 
basic fair trial guarantees. However, this latter requirement causes further dilemmas, as it is 
far from obvious whether truth commissions can ensure due process guarantees. 
Theoretically, truth commissions can fulfil the criteria as their main objective is to 
promote reconciliation and not to support impunity.114 Effective inquiry of the facts through 
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testimony or written evidence with public identification of the perpetrator can be 
accomplished by a properly functioning truth commission, and its independence and 
impartiality might be safeguarded, especially with international support, but it is still far from 
probable that a truth commission process could ever be enough for the Prosecutor and the Pre-
Trial Chamber to decide in favor of that process on the basis of inadmissibility. 
There is a slight possibility that the UN Security Council would initiate the deferral of 
the investigation or prosecution preferring a truth process as a more optimal solution 
according to Article 16115 of the Statute, and adopting a resolution under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter. This is not likely to be applicable to truth processes, since this decision is valid 
only for a temporary period of 12 months and it may not serve as an instrument to ensure 
permanent respect for an amnesty law and a reconciliation process.116 However, as it is a 
renewable request and considering the strong opposition of the United States related to the 
functioning of the Court, it is quite possible that the Security Council will make such a 
decision in the future, ensuring priority to an internal solution of transitional justice instead of 
criminal jurisdiction at the international level. 
However, a decision about the preference of a truth commission process is still the most 
probable under the conditions set out in Article 53117 of the Rome Statute. This entitles the 
Prosecutor to decide not to investigate if it would not be in the interest of justice, and the Pre-
Trial Chamber of the Court does not have any objection regarding this decision. In this 
context the notion of justice is comprehended in a broad way, it is understood as a public 
interest. For instance, if trials contributed directly to the prolongation of political instability or 
to the renewal of violence, they could hardly be interpreted as being in the interest of 
justice.118 On the other hand, the existence of a truth commission in the affected country 
makes the decision about the suspension of investigation more probable if the Prosecutor sees 
another mechanism in the country serving transitional justice. 
There are numerous circumstances that must be considered by the Prosecutor before 
taking such a decision, namely: (i) Was the establishment of the institution based on a 
democratic will? (ii) Can the preference of a truth commission process over criminal 
proceedings be explained by real economic, social and political necessities? (iii) Can a full 
and effective inquiry of facts be accomplished by the commission? (iv) Are the perpetrators 
identified publicly? (v) Is the commission independent and proper to ensure due process 
                                                          
115   Text of Article 16: 
 „No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a period 
of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same 
conditions.” 
116 STAHN (note 111), 699 
117   Text of the relevant passages of Article 53: 
 “1. The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or her, initiate an 
investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute. In 
deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether: […] 
 (c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are nonetheless 
substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.” 
 2 If, upon investigation, the Prosecutor concludes that there is not a sufficient basis for a prosecution 
because: […] 
 (c) A prosecution is not in the interest of justice, taking into account all the circumstances, including the 
gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her 
role in the alleged crime; […] 
 3 (b) In addition, the Pre-Trial Chamber may, on its own initiative, review a decision of the Prosecutor 
not to proceed if it is based solely on paragraph 1 (c) or 2 (c). In such a case, the decision of the Prosecutor 
shall be effective only if confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.” 
118 SEILS and WIERDA (note 10), 12 
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guarantees? (vi) Is there any kind of penalty such as social service imposed on the 
perpetrators? (vii) Does it serve the interests of victims and the aim of justice?119 
 
The notion of the ‘interest of victims’ is not easy to determine it depends on the specific 
circumstances of the situation. In some cases criminal justice would rather serve their interests 
than a reconciliation process and reintegration of perpetrators with a conditional amnesty. The 
latter version could be the basis of the South African reconciliation process, but the people of 
Rwanda could not be expected to accept such a solution. Likewise, the 'interest of justice' is 
linked to specific cases and not to general criteria. Regarding this issue it is important to 
devote attention to the possibility that there might be an urgent need for the establishment of 
both criminal courts and truth and reconciliation commissions, and in these cases their proper 
and efficient parallel functioning must be ensured through well-prepared regulations. At the 
same time it must be emphasized that even the simultaneous and efficient work of these two 
types of institutions is not enough for a long-term reconciliation. A fundamental change in the 
minds of people, proper reparations to the victims, economic development and democratic 
changes in the structure of the institutions are indispensable as well in order to reach real 
reconciliation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
119 ROBINSON (note 111), 498 
